Arztinduzierte Nachfrage in der ambulanten Versorgung - Bedeutung fuer eine Privatisierung von Leistungen der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung -

Axel Kern ()

No 225, Discussion Paper Series from Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics

Abstract: There is an ongoing debate on the phenomenon of physician induced demand. The question is whether the equilibrating forces of supply and demand are effective in the medical sector leading to a state of Pareto-optimality. The issue of improved availability vs. induced demand has not been solved yet. The consumer sovereignty thereby is a crucial determinant for bilateral contracting between the physician and the patient. Consequently, the discussion concerning what medical services should not be covered in mandatory health insurance has to consider conditions to realize consumer sovereignty. Here we discuss what changes in reimbursement, delivery of services, competition of physicians, and availability of information for patients might improve the performance of the medical sector.

Keywords: physician-induced demand; privatisation; mandatory health insurance; physician-patient relation; treatment process; information; principal-agent; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aug:augsbe:0225

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