Vertikale Kooperation im OligopolDie Gestaltung der Genossenschaftsorganisation als strategischer Zug

Michael Higl ()
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Michael Higl: University of Augsburg, Department of Economics

No 243, Discussion Paper Series from Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics

Abstract: In cooperatives, allocation of competences results in an organizationalform which differs from other enterprises. The members partly remain independentin doing their business and delegate only a part of their competence tothe jointly owned firm. Therefore a cooperative is neither a single firmnor a group of fully independent entities. In this paper the conduct ofthe hybrid organization is characterized by the concept of "conjecturalvariations". I show for two different objectives of the cooperative thatit is possible to patronise members in competition with a profit maximizingfirm. The choice of decentralization of decision making is crucial for theresults. It can be seen as a credible commitment to the behaviour of thecooperative and it has therefore important influence on the outcomes: Ina mixed duopoly with a cooperative patronizing their members the resultsare more competitive than in a pure duopoly.

Keywords: E-Commerce; Personalization; Asymmetric information; Price discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D82 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aug:augsbe:0243

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