Steuerung des GKV-Arzneimittelmarktes – Auswirkungen von Selbstbeteiligungen und Härtefallregelungen

Bernhard Langer (), Anita B. Pfaff () and Axel Kern ()
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Bernhard Langer: University of Augsburg, Department of Economics
Anita B. Pfaff: University of Augsburg, Department of Economics

No 285, Discussion Paper Series from Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics

Abstract: This analysis shows that hardship and not hardship cases respectively reject clear differences both at the demand and at the expenditures for pharmaceuticals financed by the statutory health insurance. Hardship cases without exemption regulations would be burden therefore by enormous co-payments. Moreover, it also turns out that straight hardship cases are less healthy on average than not hardship cases. Co-payments without accompanying hardship case regulations would therefore hardly make a supply possible adapted to the needs of hardship cases. On the other hand the effectivity of drug co-payment regulations is reduced by hardship case regulations considerably.

Keywords: co-payments; pharmaceutical market; statutory health insurance; public finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06
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