Public and Private Health Insurance in Germany: The Ignored Risk Selection Problem

Martina Grunow and Robert Nuscheler

No 312, Discussion Paper Series from Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics

Abstract: While risk selection within the German public health insurance system has received considerable attention, risk selection between public and private health insurers has largely been ignored. This is surprising since – given the institutional structure – risk selection between systems is likely to be more pronounced. We find clear evidence for risk selection in favor of private insurers. While private insurers are unable to select the healthy upon enrollment they manage to dump high risk individuals who then end up in the public system. This gives private insurers an unjustified competitive advantage vis-à-vis public insurer. A risk adjusted compensation would mitigate this advantage.

Keywords: risk selection; public and private health insurance; risk adjustment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C13 C23 I10 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/opus4/files/71113/312.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN GERMANY: THE IGNORED RISK SELECTION PROBLEM (2014)
Working Paper: Public and Private Health Insurance in Germany: The Ignored Risk Selection Problem (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aug:augsbe:0312

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