Minimum Quality Standards and Market Structure: When Regulation Eliminates the High-Quality Product
Peter Michaelis ()
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Peter Michaelis: University of Augsburg, Department of Economics, https://www.uni-augsburg.de/en/fakultaet/wiwi/prof/vwl/prof-dr-peter-michaelis-environmental-and-resource-economics/team/michaelis/
No 349, Discussion Paper Series from Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics
Abstract:
We study how minimum quality standards (MQSs) interact with market size when quality entails marginal production costs and non-recurring investment. In a vertically differentiated duopoly with endogenous quality choice, price competition, and an outside option, the unregulated duopoly remains viable at every positive market size because firms lower quality in smaller markets. A binding MQS restricts this adjustment and creates a strictly positive market-size viability boundary. Which firm reaches it first depends on market size relative to standard stringency. In relatively small markets, the constrained low-quality firm loses viability first. In relatively large markets, the unconstrained high-quality firm does so because induced upgrading raises its non-recurring investment burden. Crossing this boundary eliminates the high-quality product and yields a stable low-quality-only outcome, with no profitable re-entry by the high-quality firm. A marginally binding MQS raises welfare at every finite market size. When market size is sufficiently large relative to the investment burden, the welfare-maximizing standard is interior; when it is sufficiently small, duopoly viability binds first. The welfare-maximizing standard rises with market size. Separate policies that shrink the effective customer base or raise the non-recurring investment burden required for compliance can make an otherwise viable duopoly non-viable. The viability structure can also give a firm an incentive to support regulatory tightening that makes its rival non-viable.
Keywords: Minimum quality standard; Market size; Quality investment; Market structure; Duopoly viability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L15 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aug:augsbe:349
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