Unanimity under Ambiguity

Simona Fabrizi (), Steffen Lippert, Addison Pan and Matthew Ryan ()
Additional contact information
Addison Pan: Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, P. R. China
Matthew Ryan: School of Economics, Faculty of Business, Economics and Law, AUT University

No 2021-07, Working Papers from Auckland University of Technology, Department of Economics

Abstract: Ellis (2016) introduced a variant of the classic (jury) voting game in which voters have ambiguous prior beliefs. He focussed on voting under majority rule and the implications of ambiguity for Condorcet’s Theorem. Ryan (2021) studied Ellis’s game when voting takes place under the unanimity rule. His focus was on the implications of ambiguity for the “jury paradox” (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998). Neither paper described all equilibria of these games, though both authors identified equilibria with a very different structure to those in the respective games without ambiguity. We complete the description of all equilibria of voting games under the unanimity rule. In particular, we identify equilibria having the same form as those in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), as well as equilibria with a “dual” form.

Date: 2021-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Unanimity under Ambiguity (2024)
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