Asylum providers: Hawks or Doves?
CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University
I examine the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of an asylum provision game in pure strategies, assuming that asylum is an international public good. An equilibrium does not necessarily exist because the players. payo¤s are not quasiconcave. When an equilibrium exists, it is either unique or multiple. When multiple equilibria arise, the game is a variant of hawk-dove game. Multiple equilibria suggest the counter-intuitive possibility that the more popular destination is more open to refugees even though openness is not modeled to boost popularity.
Keywords: asylum seekers; refugee protection; international public goods; chicken game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 F53 H87 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mig
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:auu:dpaper:699
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