Collusive networks in market-sharing agreements under the presence of an antitrust authority

Flavia Roldán
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Flavia Roldán: Universidad ORT Uruguay. Facultad de Administración y Ciencias Sociales. Departmento de Economía / University of Navarra. IESE Business School. Public-Private Sector Research Center
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Flavia Roldán

No 80, Documentos de Investigación from Universidad ORT Uruguay. Facultad de Administración y Ciencias Sociales

Abstract: This article studies how the presence of an antitrust authority affects market-sharing agreements made by firms. These agreements prevent firms from entering each other’s market. The set of these agreements defines a collusive network, which is pursued by antitrust authorities. This article shows that while in the absence of the antitrust authority, a network is stable if its alliances are large enough, when considering the antitrust authority, more competitive structures can be sustained through bilateral agreements. Antitrust laws may have a pro-competitive effect, as they give firms in large alliances more incentives to cut their agreements at once.

Keywords: market-sharing; economic networks; antitrust authority; oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2012-10
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Working Paper: Collusive networks in market-sharing agreements under the presence of an antitrust authority (2010)
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