Politics and institutional change: The Water Commission Act of 1913

Mark Kanazawa

No 2024-02, Working Papers from Carleton College, Department of Economics

Abstract: Economists have long argued that increasing resource scarcity can lead to more clearly defined individual property rights, but the precise mechanism whereby this occurs remains unclear to this day. This paper documents the role of politics in shaping the creation of individual property rights within the context of appropriative water law in early 20 th century California, finding evidence of interest group influence in establishing a new system for administering appropriative water rights. It also presents evidence on subsequent irrigation development that is consistent with the influence of irrigating farmers on creation of the new system

JEL-codes: K11 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02
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Working Paper: Politics and Institutional change: The Water Commission Act of 1913 (2025)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:avv:wpaper:2024-02

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