The Creation of Social Norms under Weak Institutions
Joseph Luomba and
Israel Waichman ()
No 684, Working Papers from University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Preventing overﬁshing at Lake Victoria is a typical situation where policies have to rely on norm-based interventions to improve outcomes. Our lab-in-the-ﬁeld experiment studies how information about high or low levels of previous cooperation aﬀects the creation of social norms in a three-player prisoner’s dilemma game with/without a feedback mechanism. The provision of social information succeeds in creating norms of cooperation only if a feedback mechanism is available. Without feedback, social information cannot prevent the decline of cooperation rates. Exploring the role of the reference network, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect increases with social proximity among participants.
Keywords: common pool resource; collective action; social norms; lab-in-the-field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: The Creation of Social Norms under Weak Institutions (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:awi:wpaper:0684
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