Enhanced Guidance for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems: Mitigating Moral Hazard

International Association of Deposit Insurers

No 13-05, IADI Guidance Papers from International Association of Deposit Insurers

Abstract: This paper discusses the problem of moral hazard in the context of deposit insurance and the financial safety net. As requested by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) Thematic Review of Deposit Insurance Systems: Peer Review Report, the paper suggests additional guidance on the types of instruments and good practices that can help mitigate moral hazard.

Keywords: deposit insurance; bank resolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:awl:guipap:1305

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