Bargaining over information structures
Kemal Kivvanc Akoz and
Arseniy Samsonov ()
Additional contact information
Kemal Kivvanc Akoz: Faculty of Economic Sciences, HSE University
Arseniy Samsonov: Research Centre of Quantitative Social and Management Sciences, Budapest University of Technology and Economics
No 2301, Discussion Papers from Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Quantitative Social and Management Sciences
How transparent are informational institutions if their founders have to agree on the design? We analyze a model where several agents bargain over persuasion of a single receiver. We characterize the existence of anagreement that is beneficial for all agents relative to some fixed benchmark information structure, when the preferences of agents are state-independent, and provide sufficient conditions for general preferences. We further show that a beneficial agreement exists if, for every coalition of a fixed size, there is a belief that generates enough surplus for its members. Next, we concentrate on agent-partitional environments, where for each agent there is a state where the informed decision of the receiver benefits her the most. In these environments, we define endorsement rules that fully reveal all such agent-states. Endorsement rules are Pareto efficient when providing information at all agent-states generates enough surplus, and they correspond to a Nash Bargaining solution when the environment is also symmetric. We provide two political economic applications of our model. In a running example, we discuss the implication of our model to bargaining of authoritarian elites over media policy. The last section applies the model to an electoral campaign in a multiparty democracy.
Keywords: Persuasion; Bargaining solution; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://qsms.bme.hu/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/QSMS_DP_23_001_Akoz_Samsonov.pdf First version, 2023 (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:azp:qsmswp:2301
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Papers from Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Quantitative Social and Management Sciences Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Luca Sandrini ().