Identification of discrete choice models for bundles and binary games

Jeremy Fox and Natalia Lazzati

No 04/13, CeMMAP working papers from Institute for Fiscal Studies

Abstract: We study nonparametric identification of single-agent discrete choice models for bundles and binary games of complete information. We provide conditions under which we can recover both the interaction effects and the distributions of potentially correlated unobservables across goods in single-agent models and across players in games. We establish similarities in identification between these two models. Strengthening our assumptions for games, we provide an equivalence relation between discrete choice models for bundles and binary games that relies on the theory of potential games. Potential games are particularly useful for games of three or more players.

Date: 2013-02-27
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Working Paper: Identification of discrete choice models for bundles and binary games (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:azt:cemmap:04/13

DOI: 10.1920/wp.cem.2013.0413

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