Estimating Matching Games with Transfers

Jeremy Fox

No 14/16, CeMMAP working papers from Institute for Fiscal Studies

Abstract: I explore the estimation of transferable utility matching games, encompassing many-to-many matching, marriage and matching with trading networks (trades). I introduce a matching maximum score estimator that does not suffer from a computational curse of dimensionality in the number of agents in a matching market. I apply the estimator to data on the car parts supplied by automotive suppliers to estimate the returns from different portfolios of parts to suppliers and automotive assemblers.

Date: 2016-03-24
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cemmap.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/CWP1416.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Estimating Matching Games with Transfers (2016)
Working Paper: Estimating Matching Games with Transfers (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:azt:cemmap:14/16

DOI: 10.1920/wp.cem.2016.1416

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CeMMAP working papers from Institute for Fiscal Studies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dermot Watson ().