Nonparametric estimation of sponsored search auctions and impact of Ad quality on search revenue

Dongwoo Kim and Pallavi Pal

No 16/24, CeMMAP working papers from Institute for Fiscal Studies

Abstract: This paper presents an empirical model of sponsored search auctions where advertisers are ranked by bid and ad quality. Our model is developed under the ‘incomplete information’ setting with a general quality scoring rule. We establish nonparametric identification of the advertiser’s valuation and its distribution given observed bids and introduce novel nonparametric estimators. Using Yahoo! search auction data, we estimate value distributions and study the bidding behavior across product categories. We also conduct counterfactual analysis to evaluate the impact of different quality scoring rules on the auctioneer’s revenue. Product specific scoring rules can enhance auctioneer revenue by at most 24.3% at the expense of advertiser profit (-28.3%) and consumer welfare (-30.2%). The revenue maximizing scoring rule depends on market competitiveness.

Date: 2024-08-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-des
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https://www.cemmap.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/0 ... n-search-revenue.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Nonparametric estimation of sponsored search auctions and impacts of ad quality on search revenue (2023)
Working Paper: Nonparametric Estimation of Sponsored Search Auctions and Impacts of AD Quality on Search Revenue (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:azt:cemmap:16/24

DOI: 10.47004/wp.cem.2024.1624

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