Guessing Games and People Behaviours: What Can we Learn?

Andrea Morone and Piergiuseppe Morone ()

No 15, SERIES from Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro"

Abstract: In this paper we address the topic of guessing games. By developing a generalised theory of naïveté, we show how Güth et al..s result (i.e. convergence toward interior equilibria is faster than convergence toward boundary equilibria) is compatible with Nagel.s theory of boundedly rational behaviour. However, we also show how, under new model parameterisation, neither Güth et al..s story of convergence towards interior equilibria, nor Nagel.s theory of boundedly rational behaviour are verified. We conclude that the results of Nagel (1995) and Güth et al. (2002), however interesting, are severely affected by the ad hoc parameterisation chosen for the game.

Keywords: game; p-beauty contest; individual behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 672
Date: 2007-02, Revised 2007-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.seriesworkingpapers.it/RePEc/bai/series/Economia-Series15.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bai:series:economia-series15

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SERIES from Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro" Largo Abbazia S. Scolastica, 53 - 70124 - Bari - ITALY. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Annalisa Vinella ().