Share issue privatization and political objectives: do governments make a difference?
Germà Bel ()
No 56, Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia
This paper empirically analyzes the political and economic objectives underlying privatization on the stock market. Particularly, I explain the factors of SIPs underpricing, and analyze if the change of political parties in government play a role on the issue. The paper has two main findings. Fist, larger initial returns occurred in the early stages of privatization. Second, the change of government from left-wing to right-wing did not lead to significantly higher levels of underpricing. My results show that governments are quite pragmatic with respect to underpricing: maximizing proceeds from SIPs shows to be more important than ideological differences between parties in government.
JEL-codes: E62 G32 L32 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bar:bedcje:199956
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