The assignment game: core bounds for mixe-pair coalitions

Marina Núñez () and Carlos Rafels Pallarola
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Carlos Rafels Pallarola: Universitat de Barcelona

No 84, Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia

Abstract: In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the core of the game. These games will be called buyerseller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixedpair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyerseller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixedpair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a 45olattice by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered.

JEL-codes: C71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2002
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