Single-valued solutions for the Bohm-Bawerk horse market game

Marina Núñez () and Carlos Rafels Pallarola
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Carlos Rafels Pallarola: Universitat de Barcelona

No 104, Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia

Abstract: Singlevalued solutions for the case of twosided market games without product differentiation, also known as B ohmBawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this set of games in terms of the assignment matrix is provided.

JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2003
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