Regular Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes and the Core

Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar
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Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar: Universitat de Barcelona

No 110, Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia

Abstract: A subclass of games with population monotonic allocation schemes is studied, namely games with regular population monotonic allocation schemes (rpmas). We focus on the properties of these games and we prove the coincidence between the core and both the Davis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2003
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