Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

Francesc Llerena and Carlos Rafels Pallarola
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Carlos Rafels Pallarola: Universitat de Barcelona
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francesc Llerena Garrés

No 123, Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia

Abstract: We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with nonnegative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition.

JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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