Uniform-price assignment markets

Marina Núñez () and Carlos Rafels Pallarola
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Carlos Rafels Pallarola: Universitat de Barcelona

No 135, Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia

Abstract: Uniform{price assignment games are introduced as those assignment mar- kets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the BAohm{Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus.

JEL-codes: C71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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