A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core

Jesus Getan and Jesus Montes
Additional contact information
Jesus Montes: Universitat de Barcelona

No 193, Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia

Abstract: Cooperative TU-games with large core were introduced by Sharkey (1982) and the concept of Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme was defined by Sprumont (1990). Linking these two concepts, Moulin (1990) introduces the notion of large monotonic core giving a characterization for three-player games. In this paper we prove that all games with large monotonic core are convex. We give an effective criterion to determine whether a game has large monotonic core and, as a consequence, we obtain a characterization for the four-player case.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ere.ub.es/dtreball/E08193.rdf/at_download/file
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to www.ere.ub.es:80 (A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond.)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bar:bedcje:2008193

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia Espai de Recerca en Economia, Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques. Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, Num 1-11 08034 Barcelona. Spain.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Espai de Recerca en Economia ().