An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

Francesc Llerena (Universitat Rovira i Virgili - Creip), Marina Núñez () and Carles Rafels (Universitat de Barcelona)
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Carles Rafels (Universitat de Barcelona): Universitat de Barcelona
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francesc Llerena Garrés

No 286, Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia

Abstract: On the domain of two-sided assignment markets, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies derived consistency (Owen, 1992) and complaint mono- tonicity on sectors size. As a consequence, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the inter- section between the core and the kernel of a coalitional game in Maschler et al (1979).

JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 0 pages
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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