Intermediated vs. Direct Sales and a No-Discrimination Rule

Sebastian Wismer

No 131, Working Papers from Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE)

Abstract: When sellers join a platform to sell their products, the platform operator may restrict their strategic decisions. In fact, several platform operators impose most-favored treatment or no-discrimination rules (NDRs), asking sellers not to offer better sales conditions elsewhere. In this paper, I analyze a model that allows for an endogenous split-up of consumers between sales channels. Competing sellers might set different prices across channels, depending on the platform tariff and presence of aNDR. I find that the platform operator imposes a NDR if he faces high transaction costs, if seller competition is weak, and if the initial distribution of consumers on channels is strongly skewed. Prohibiting NDRs can have both positive and negative effects on welfare.

Keywords: Intermediation; Platform pricing; No-discrimination rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 L42 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2013-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://bgpe.cms.rrze.uni-erlangen.de/files/2023/0 ... crimination-Rule.pdf First version, 2013 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Intermediated vs. Direct Sales and a No-Discrimination Rule (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bav:wpaper:131_wismer

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anton Barabasch ().