Search and Multiple Jobholding
Etienne Lalé ()
No 22-07, Working Papers from Chair in macroeconomics and forecasting, University of Quebec in Montreal's School of Management
Abstract:
This paper develops an equilibrium model of the labor market with hours worked, off-and on-the-job search, and single as well as multiple jobholders. The model quantitatively accounts for the incidence of and worker flows in and out of multiple jobholding. Central to the model's mechanism is that holding a second job ties the worker to her primary employer, at the benefits of having a stronger outside option to bargain with the outside employer. The model is also informative of how multiple jobholding shapes the outcomes that are typically the focus of search models. Multiple jobholding has opposing effects on job-to-job transitions that mostly offset each other. At the same time, since the option of having second jobs makes the main job survive longer, it reduces job separations and increases the employment rate. These findings have material implications for the calibration of standard models which ignore multiple jobholding.
Keywords: Multiple jobholding; Employment; Hours worked; Job search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J21 J62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2022-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://chairemacro.esg.uqam.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/146/mjh-search.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Search and Multiple Jobholding (2022) 
Working Paper: Search and Multiple Jobholding (2019) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bbh:wpaper:22-07
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Chair in macroeconomics and forecasting, University of Quebec in Montreal's School of Management Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dalibor Stevanovic and Alain Guay ().