Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information

Jihong Lee
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Jihong Lee: Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics, Birkbeck

No 717, Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance from Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics

Abstract: This paper considers a buyer-seller contracting model in which the seller possesses private information about all relevant aspects of the state of nature, including how much each action is worth to the buyer. We argue that, given asymmetric information, the buyer may not entirely dismiss an unforeseen contingency claim by the seller. Then, if the buyer lacks the foresight/awareness to "expect the unexpected", the model admits an equilibrium in which a seemingly complete contract is written and then renegotiated along its outcome path to generate inefficiency ex post.

JEL-codes: C79 D82 D86 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/26895 First version, 2007 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information (2008)
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