Informed Trading in Parallel Bond Markets

Paola Paiardini

No 908, Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance from Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics

Abstract: In this paper we investigate the presence of asymmetric information in the parallel trading of ten-year government fixed rate bonds (BTP) on two secondary electronic platforms: the business-to-business (B2B) MTS platform and the business-to-customer (B2C) BondVision one. The two platforms are typified by a different degree of transparency. We investigate whether the probability to encounter an informed trader on the less transparent market is higher than the corresponding probability on the more transparent one. Our results show that on BondVision, that is the less transparent platform, the probability of encountering an informed trader is higher. Finally we perform a series of tests to check the robustness of our estimates. Two tests do not meet the hypothesis of independence. Nevertheless, these findings do not controvert the hypothesis of our model, but call for further analysis.

Date: 2009-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-fmk, nep-mic and nep-mst
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/7614 First version, 2009 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Informed trading in parallel bond markets (2015)
Working Paper: Informed Trading in Parallel Bond Markets (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bbk:bbkefp:0908

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance from Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).