Choice in the Presence of Experts

Walter Beckert ()

No 1503, Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance from Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics

Abstract: This paper considers the micro-econometric analysis of discrete choice problems in which the choice set is strategically pre-selected by a third-party advisor or expert. It delineates measures of efficiency loss arising from (i) the sets of relevant choice attributes being imperfectly aligned between ultimate bene ciary of the choice outcome and third-party expert, and (ii) pre-selected choice-sets being uniform across ultimate bene ciaries who differ in their subjective evaluations of relevant choice attributes. And it identi es inconsistencies in estimation when strategically pre-selected choice sets are treated as exogenous. Some applications to choice in healthcare and financial services markets are sketched.

Keywords: Discrete choice; expert; endogenous choice sets. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 D12 G11 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/15276 First version, 2015 (application/pdf)

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