Political Stabilization by an independent Central Bank
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Francesco Salsano: Birkbeck, University of London; Università di Milano
No 1805, Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance from Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics
The paper is an extension of the Gabillon and Martimort model (2004), which studies how the independence of the institution in charge of monetary policy may stabilize inflationary fluctuations due to political uncertainty when the economy is characterized by lobbies that seek to promote their own interests to the detriment of the general interests of society.
Keywords: Monetary Policy; Central Bank; Partisan politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac, nep-mon and nep-pol
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http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/26850 First version, 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bbk:bbkefp:1805
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