The Political Economy of Exchange Rates: The Case of the Japanese Yen

Nathalie Aminian, K.C. Fung, Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Chelsea C Lin
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Alicia Garcia Herrero

No 702, Working Papers from BBVA Bank, Economic Research Department

Abstract: This paper sets out a political economy model of strategic exchange rates, focusing in the importance of external lobbying. Applying it for the recent history of the Japanese yen, we show that pressure from the U.S. trade negotiators contributed to an appreciation of the Japanese yen, as well as to a reduction in import prices and profits of Japanese commercial banks.

Keywords: political economy model; lobbying; Japan; yen (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F31 F59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2007-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bbv:wpaper:0702

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