Debiasing through auction? Inertia in the liberalization of retail markets

Paolo Bertoletti () and Clara Poletti

No 47, IEFE Working Papers from IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy

Abstract: We analize a market in the process of liberalization. Consumers are biased in favor of the incumbent firm and we assume that they can discover the true value of new suppliers only by switching. In an infinitely-repeated game setting with Bertrand competition, we first show that efficient entry might not take place. We then evaluate the effect of organizing a public auction for assigning consumers to a default supplier and show that such a mechanism (which respects the freedom of choice by consumers) would support entry efficiency. However, auctioning might also increase inefficient, although temporary, entry.

Keywords: electricity retail; default supplier; entry; competition policy; universal service; obligations. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2012
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