Bargaining Power and Value Sharing in Distribution Networks: A Cooperative Game Theory Approach
Roberto Roson () and
No 61, IEFE Working Papers from IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy
This paper illustrates a methodology for analyzing bargaining games on network markets, by means of numerical models that can be calibrated with real data. Economic incentives to join or to expand a network depend on how the network surplus is being distributed, which in turn depends on a variety of factors: position of each agent (e.g., a country) in a specific network, its reliability in the cooperation scheme (e.g., geo-political stability), existence of market distortions and availability of outside options (e.g., alternative energy sources). This study is aimed at presenting a game theory methodology that can be applied to real world cases, having the potential to shed light on several political economy issues. The methodology is presented and illustrated with application to a fictitious network structure. The method is based on a two-stage process: first, a network optimization model is used to generate payoff values under different coalitions and network structures; a second model is subsequently employed to identify cooperative game solutions. Any change in the network structure entails both a variation in the overall welfare level and in the distribution of surplus among agents, as it affects their relative bargaining power. Therefore, expected costs and benefits, at the aggregate as well as at the individual level, can be compared to assess the economic viability of any investment in network infrastructure. A number of model variants and extensions are also considered: changing demand, exogenous instability factors, market distortions, externalities and outside options.
Keywords: Network Markets; Cooperative Games; Distribution Networks; Bargaining. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C71 L95 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-net
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Journal Article: Bargaining Power and Value Sharing in Distribution Networks: A Cooperative Game Theory Approach (2015)
Working Paper: Bargaining Power and Value Sharing in Distribution Networks: a Cooperative Game Theory Approach (2014)
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