Evaluating Spectrum Auctions in India

Rajat Kathuria (), Mansi Kedia, Richa Sekhani and Kaushambi Bagchi
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Rajat Kathuria: Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER)

Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) Report from Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), New Delhi, India

Abstract: Designing spectrum auctions are always fraught with risk. The over reliance on reserve prices may not necessarily yield successful market outcomes. There are several other factors that influence auction outcomes such as bidder turnouts, market conditions and choice of auctioning agent.The auction design is also crucial. India currently follows a Simultaneous Multi-Round Ascending Auction (SMRA) which, while providing the option of price discovery, also poses an aggregation risk. Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCA), are a popular alternative as they avoid aggregation risks and are arguably more efficient. However, they are complex and require sophisticated bidder participation.

Keywords: Spectrum Auctions; Combinatorial Clock Auctions; Multi-Round Ascending Auction; icrier (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 page
Date: 2019-04
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