The Credibility of Central Bank Announcements

Marco Hoeberichts ()

No 221, Working Papers from Banco de España

Abstract: In this paper, we present a monetary policy game in which the central bank has a private forecast of supply and demand shocks. The public needs to form its inflationary expectations and can make use of central bank announcements. However, because of the credibility problem that the central bank faces, the public will not believe a precise announcement. By extending the arrangement proposed by Garfinkel and Oh (1995) to a model that includes private information about both demand and supply shocks, we investigate the feasibility of making imprecise credible announcements concerning the rate of inflation.

Keywords: monetary policy; private information; announcements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2002-09
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http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaci ... o/02/Fic/dt0221e.pdf First version, September 2002 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The credibility of central bank announcements (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bde:wpaper:0221

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