Anchored to what? Payment stablecoins and the central bank balance sheet
Giuseppe Ferrero ()
Additional contact information
Giuseppe Ferrero: Bank of Italy
No 1069, Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area
Abstract:
Payment stablecoins reopen an old question in a new form: whether privately issued money, once it promises redemption at par, can remain safely anchored outside the central bank balance sheet. The answer depends on distinctions that are often compressed into a single question of 'access': direct versus indirect anchoring; the liability versus the asset side of the central bank balance sheet; access versus obligation; and the backing of a token versus the actual timing of convertibility. This paper uses these distinctions to compare the EU's MiCAR, the US GENIUS Act and the Bank of England's regime for systemic sterling stablecoins. It does not argue for one model over the others. Its aim is narrower: to clarify what each model makes safe, what it leaves to markets and intermediaries, and where the remaining fragilities may lie.
Keywords: stablecoins; central bank money; payment systems; singleness of money; convertibility; monetary policy implementation; financial regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 E58 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2026-1069/QEF_1069_26.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_1069_26
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().