Crime and public procurement, evidence from municipalities

Giuseppe Albanese, Federico Antellini Russo () and Roberto Zampino ()
Additional contact information
Federico Antellini Russo: Luiss �Guido Carli�
Roberto Zampino: Consip

No 294, Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area

Abstract: The paper analyzes the link between the centralized purchasing of goods and services by municipalities and the context in which these administrations operate. While taking into account a number of factors that can lead to a greater or lesser use of Consip, the work focuses on the link between that choice and the local crime rate. The empirical analysis shows that, in low-crime areas only, an increase in crime is positively correlated with the frequency with which municipalities entrust vendor selection to a third party in order to attempt to limit the risk of inefficiency (passive waste) that would otherwise arise. The relationship is the inverse in high-crime areas, suggesting a growing willingness by municipalities to maintain autonomous control over purchasing, which may be linked to the possibility of extracting some of the rents produced from this activity (active waste).

Keywords: crime; fraud and corruption; efficiency; public procurement; local finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 E24 H57 H72 H83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2015-0294/QEF_294_15.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_294_15

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().