Crime and public procurement, evidence from municipalities
Giuseppe Albanese (),
Federico Antellini Russo () and
Roberto Zampino ()
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Federico Antellini Russo: Luiss ï¿½Guido Carliï¿½
Roberto Zampino: Consip
No 294, Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area
The paper analyzes the link between the centralized purchasing of goods and services by municipalities and the context in which these administrations operate. While taking into account a number of factors that can lead to a greater or lesser use of Consip, the work focuses on the link between that choice and the local crime rate. The empirical analysis shows that, in low-crime areas only, an increase in crime is positively correlated with the frequency with which municipalities entrust vendor selection to a third party in order to attempt to limit the risk of inefficiency (passive waste) that would otherwise arise. The relationship is the inverse in high-crime areas, suggesting a growing willingness by municipalities to maintain autonomous control over purchasing, which may be linked to the possibility of extracting some of the rents produced from this activity (active waste).
Keywords: crime; fraud and corruption; efficiency; public procurement; local finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 E24 H57 H72 H83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_294_15
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