The awarding of public works in Italy: an analysis of the mechanisms for the selection of contractors

Francesco Decarolis, Cristina Giorgiantonio and Valentina Giovanniello ()
Additional contact information
Valentina Giovanniello: Tribunale di Roma

No 83, Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area

Abstract: Despite successive reforms, public procurement in Italy is still highly fragmented and vulnerable to collusion, corruption and ex-post renegotiation. Other defects are found in the planning stages of the works. These problems are due in part to the regulations on the awarding of public works contracts, which do not guarantee the correct functioning of the selection mechanisms. Indications from the economic literature and international comparisons suggest a series of possible improvements: i) the elimination of automatic exclusion mechanisms for anomalous tenders (which would reduce the risk of collusion between bidders); ii) the centralization of assessments of anomalous offers under the responsibility of larger adjudicating authorities, with an increase in the surety guarantees provided by the winner, to reduce the risk of subsequent renegotiations; iii) stronger anti-corruption measures; iv) more standardized planning and, for the more complex auctions, competitive dialogue.

Keywords: infrastructure; auctions; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 H57 K23 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-reg
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2010-0083/QEF_83.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The awarding of public works in Italy: an analysis of the mechanisms for the selection of contractors (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_83_10

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().