Fiscal buffers, private debt and recession: the good, the bad and the ugly

Nicoletta Batini, Giovanni Melina and Stefania Villa

No 1186, Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area

Abstract: Focusing on Euro-Area countries, we show empirically that higher private debt leads to deeper recessions while higher public debt does not, unless its level is especially high. We then build a general equilibrium model that replicates these dynamics and use it to design a policy that can mitigate the recessionary consequences of private deleveraging. In the model, in the aftermath of financial shocks, recessions are milder and public debt is more contained when the government lends directly to those households and firms that face binding borrowing constraints. As a consequence, large fiscal buffers are critical to enhance macroeconomic resilience to financial shocks.

Keywords: private debt; public debt; financial crisis; financial shocks; borrowing constraints; fiscal limits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 E62 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-eec, nep-fdg, nep-mac and nep-opm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: Fiscal buffers, private debt, and recession: The good, the bad and the ugly (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_1186_18

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