Do female leaders choose women? evidence from visible and hidden appointments

Andrea Cintolesi and Edoardo Frattola ()
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Edoardo Frattola: Bank of Italy

No 1432, Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area

Abstract: We study whether female leaders appoint more women to executive positions than their male counterparts. We use mixed-gender close elections in Italian municipalities since 1993 and observe the share of women appointed by mayors to the local government (visible appointments) and to the boards of directors of municipal state-owned enterprises (hidden appointments). We find that when a woman narrowly defeats a man, the share of women appointed to visible positions drops by 5.7 percentage points, while the share of women appointed to hidden positions does not change. The effect does not appear until the early 2000s, when gender issues began to receive attention, and it occurs earlier in regions where public opinion is more sensitive to gender equality. These findings suggest that male leaders appoint more women to visible positions because they are subject to greater scrutiny on gender issues than female leaders.

Keywords: gender; female leaders; close elections; appointments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J16 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gen, nep-pol and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_1432_23

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