Informational Effects of Monetary Policy
Giuseppe Ferrero,
Marcello Miccoli () and
Sergio Santoro
No 982, Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area
Abstract:
We analyse a simplified New-Keynesian model with an unobserved aggregate cost-push shock in which firms and the central bank have different information about the shock. We consider a linear policy rule where a pure inflation targeting central bank decides how much to react to the shock given its information. In this framework we show that monetary policy performs both an allocational and an informational role, the latter due to firms extracting information on the aggregate shock from the monetary policy tool. When the informational role is present, optimal monetary policy is more cautious, that is, it responds less to the shock than the perfect information benchmark. A more cautious reaction to the shock implies that firms make more effective use of their private information and the endogenous information coming from the aggregate price in order to make inferences about the shock.
Keywords: imperfect information; endogenous information; learning; monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_982_14
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