Analysis of Optimal Bids in the Primary Auction of Mexican Federal Government Bonds: Results of a Structural Econometric Modeling Approach

Sara Castellanos and Oviedo Marco

No 2004-07, Working Papers from Banco de México

Abstract: In this article we analyze the treasury securities primary auctions of the Mexican Federal Government, using a structural econometric model of Février, Préget and Visser (2002). This model allows to make revenue comparisons across auction formats. Our analysis shows the revenue superiority of the uniform auction format over the discriminatory one. Comparisons with previous estimations as well as simulation exercises of the securities' value signals, suggest that this result may be explained by the winner's curse.

JEL-codes: C52 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-prensa/ ... -1651FB236E7C%7D.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2004-07

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Banco de México Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Subgerencia de desarrollo de sistemas ().