How Employment Framing Affects Trade Preferences: Evidence from Survey Experiments

Marisol Rodríguez Chatruc, Ernesto Stein, Razvan Vlaicu and Victor Zuluaga

No 2026-08, Working Papers from Banco de México

Abstract: International trade increases aggregate welfare but also creates winners and losers, making it politically contentious. Recent research has established that individuals are more sensitive to anti-trade information about employment loss than to pro-trade information about lower prices or greater variety. This paper studies how individual attitudes and beliefs change in response to information about employment losses (in import-competing sectors), gains (in export-oriented sectors), and the possibility of compensation for displaced workers. To this end, a large-scale survey experiment was implemented in 18 Latin American countries using nationally representative samples. The results suggest that anti-trade information reduces support for trade even when compensation is mentioned, while pro-trade messages increase support only when they emphasize employment gains. Belief updating about trade's employment effects seems to be a relevant mechanism.

Keywords: International trade; Attitudes; Employment; Survey experiment; Latin America (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-int
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