Consumer Consent Regulation

Roland Strausz

No 53, Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers from Berlin School of Economics

Abstract: Consumer consent regulation is the cornerstone of modern data privacy regulation such as the European GDPR and the Californian CCPA. By ensuring that consumers can reject any harmful data collection, the regulation seems an effective tool for protecting consumers against price discrimination. By contrast, I provide the insight that consent regulation alone is ineffective because it provides firms with the loophole to commit to unattractive offers to dissenting consumers. Effective consent regulation therefore requires an explicit regulation of the firm's dissent offer. This is informationally demanding; regulation that merely insists on ``reasonable'' (sequential rational) offers is ineffective.

Keywords: privacy regulation; data collection; price discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2024-11-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-hsog/files/5654/BSoE_DP_0053.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0053

DOI: 10.48462/opus4-5654

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers from Berlin School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Reiter ().