Bismarck's Welfare State and the Socialists

Felix Kersting

No 81, Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers from Berlin School of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the political consequences of introducing the welfare state targeted at blue-collar workers in 19th-century Germany. I conceptualize Bismarck’s reform as an accommodation strategy to combat the socialist party as an emerging challenger party. The result of a difference-in-differences design shows that the socialist party benefited in elections due to the reform. The mechanism analysis points to the socialists’ issue ownership by adopting a stronger reformist stance. The results are not driven by other political and economic channels related to the reform.

Keywords: welfare state; socialism; issue ownership; Germany (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H53 I38 N44 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 56 pages
Date: 2025-10-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0081

DOI: 10.48462/opus4-5989

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