Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance

Juan Julio

Borradores de Economia from Banco de la Republica de Colombia

Abstract: A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problem is wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further inefficiencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularly the one established in the 1993's 100th Law in Colombia.

Keywords: Incentives; Agency Theory; Pensions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdr:borrec:546

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