Conflict Resolution under Asymmetric Information

Helmut Bester and Karl Wärneryd

Departmental Working Papers

Abstract: We consider mechanisms for resolving conflicts between two agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any mechanism must assign a positive probability of conflict. We show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information about each other.

Keywords: conflict; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D72 D74 D82 H21 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Conflict Resolution Under Asymmetric Information (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bef:lsbest:006

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