VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities

Daniel Kraehmer () and Roland Strausz
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Daniel Kraehmer: Free University of Berlin, Department of Economics

Departmental Working Papers

Abstract: For mechanism design with independent values, we identify a subclass of Vickrey--Clarke--Groves (VCG) mechanisms that induce efficient ex ante investments even with externalities. The Vickrey second price auction does not belong to this class.

Keywords: externalities; ex ante investments; efficient mechanisms; mechanism design; second price auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-02-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bef:lsbest:031

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