Network Unbundling and Flawed Coordination: Experience from the Electricity Sector

Gert Brunekreeft

Bremen Energy Working Papers from Bremen Energy Research

Abstract: What is a good balance between competition and coordination? On the upside, unbundling in network industries promotes competition, but this should be balanced against the downside of unbundling, that is, the cost of coordination. Firm-internal coordination falls away and must be replaced by external market mechanisms. This is a non-trivial task. The cost of flawed coordination resulting from frag- mentation can be substantial and policy should focus more on market mechanisms and governance structures to secure better coordination. This paper examines the problem of coordination and discusses with real-world examples why the market faces difficulty in providing effective coordination.

Keywords: electricity; railways; unbundling; regulation; competition policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L43 L51 L92 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2014-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Utilities Policy, Vol. 34, 2015, pp. 11-18

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bei:00bewp:0015

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