Insuring Morality

Tom Baker
Additional contact information
Tom Baker: University of Connecticut

University of Connecticut School of Law Working Papers from University of Connecticut School of Law

Abstract: This article describes and compares two forms of moral regulation employed in connection with insurance institutions. The first governs through moralized personal attributes or pressures like "temptation" and "character." The second governs through moralized institutional or system attributes and processes described in terms of "efficiency." The article traces these forms of moral regulation from the mid-19th century to the present, arguing that both continue to inform popular and specialized discourses of risk.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=uconn/ucwps (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bep:conlaw:uconn_ucwps-1001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in University of Connecticut School of Law Working Papers from University of Connecticut School of Law
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum (baum@bc.edu).